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SPRING SPROUTS · RESEARCH BRIEFING

Shifts in Politics of Tanintharyi

Political Developments in Tanintharyi Region

English edition

Spring Sprouts
A program under
The Ananda Center of
Participatory Democracy

This briefing examines political developments in Tanintharyi Region during the Spring Revolution through interviews with Tavoy, Karen, Kawthaung District and Myeik District political forces in the region and with Mon political forces in neighbouring areas.

Translation Note: This is AI-assisted Translation reviewed by a human editor.

Summary

- After the 2021 coup, ideas of self-determination and bottom-up federalism took hold in Tanintharyi Region, replacing reliance on the NLD's mainland-based leadership.
- Through the 2026 Tavoyan National-Level Political Conference, Tavoy forces formed the Tavoyan National Federation (TNF) and the Tavoy Army (TA).
- The TNF pursues nation-based self-determination, while the Myeik and Kawthaung district forces think in terms of geographic territory.
- The NLD/MP-led drafting of an interim arrangement has been criticised for excluding local forces, and the KDPO has demanded that the process be suspended.
- Abundant natural resources are the region's main problem, and local people are caught in between in areas of mixed control.
- Most forces support bottom-up federalism, but after some four failed attempts to establish a Tanintharyi federal unit, patient and inclusive negotiation is still needed.

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1. Introduction

Following the terrorist military's coup of 1 February 2021, mass movements emerged across the country. In most of Tanintharyi Region, which during 2015–2020 had relied solely on the National League for Democracy (NLD), a pre-dominantly mainland leadership, the coup brought a growing embrace of self-determination and bottom-up federalism among local revolutionary groups, and distinct approaches—"nationalist", "minority rights" and "geography-based federalism"—also emerged with considerable momemtum.

2. Background to Political Developments

The two main goals of the Spring Revolution—ending all forms of dictatorship, including military dictatorship, and building a federal democratic union—have had a strong influence on political forces based in Tanintharyi Region. That influence has also shaped the region's political development over the more than five years of the Spring Revolution, giving rise to political and armed revolutionary forces grounded in differing interests.

2.1 Political Forces in Tanintharyi Region

At the central level there are the NLD-dominated Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the National Unity Government (NUG), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which brings together the forces taking part in the Spring Revolution, and township-level People's Administration Teams (PATs) under NUG leadership. Born with the Spring Revolution, the Dawei District Democracy Movement Strike Committee (DDMSC) has also emerged, along with locally based groups that have taken the path of armed revolution: the Dawei District People's Defence Force (DPDF), the Dawei Defence Team (DDT), the Ba Htoo Army (BHA), the Launglon Township People's Defence Force (LLPDF), the Thayetchaung PDF and Dawei Township people's defence groups.

Tavoy (aka. Dawei) currently falls within the Myeik–Tavoy District of the Karen National Union (KNU) Brigade 4. Besides units under the KNU's armed wings, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), there are also units of the Kawthoolei Army (KTLA), which split from the KNU in 2022.

As a coalition among these disparate actors, the Tavoyan National United Political Committee (TNUPC) was formed on 12 December 2025, bringing together Tavoy revolutionary forces,

civil society organisations, unions and individual activists. It was mandated as the political organisation to lead the present and future of the Tavoyan unit. The committee also issued three points as the national political goals and basic principles of Tavoy, based on federalism, coexistence and a socio-economic system. From 28 February to 3 March 2026, the TNUPC held the "Tavoyan National-Level Political Conference" in the region, reaffirmed the three political goals and, on 10 March, formed and mandated the Tavoyan National Federation (TNF). It also built a single Tavoy Army (TA) from the Dove Guerrilla Force, the Federal Polaris Force, the Tavoy People Liberation Force (TPLF) and the Nway Oo Guerrilla Force.

3. Regional Divisions Challenging Politics

In examining political stability and development in Tanintharyi Region, this study looks beyond politics alone, at the impacts of resource extraction, of taxation that weighs heavily on local people's daily lives, of military pressure, and of the terrorist junta's military and political attacks. In doing so, it interviewed not only local political forces but also political forces in neighbouring Mon State:

- Tavoyan National Federation (TNF)
- Karen National Union (KNU)

- Kawthaung District Political Force (KDPO)
- Myeik District Political Force
- Mon revolutionary organisations

Tavoyan National Federation (TNF)

When the Spring Revolution began in 2021, Tavoy took part like other regions and, when demonstrations were no longer possible, chose the path of armed struggle. After many locally based armed groups emerged, they diverged: some came under the People's Defence Organisation (PDO) mechanism, some became NUG Ministry of Defence PDF battalions, some joined the KNU, and some stood independently as local LPDFs. From 2022 to 2024/2025, at least four attempts were made, with political, armed, education, health and humanitarian organisations, to establish the region as a federal unit, but they failed for various reasons. Before that, around March 2021, there had also been an attempt to form a Tanintharyi political coalition, which did not succeed. In early 2025, as criticism grew over political differences, military and administrative matters and local resource extraction, there was a growing view that, beyond the fall of the dictatorship, a political and military force was needed to shape and lead Tavoy's own destiny. In August 2025, young people and others concerned with Tavoy affairs held their first in-person meeting in five years of revolution, at a location on the Thai border. In November 2020, the process broadened: those who should take part and their organisations were invited to a second meeting, which began forming the Tavoyan National-Level Political Joint Committee (TNUPC/TPNUC) and took responsibility for leading the shaping of Tavoy's

Tavoyan National Federation (continued)

future. In February and early March 2026, a three-day Tavoyan National-Level Political Conference was held, and on 3 March the Tavoyan National Federation (TNF) and the Tavoy Army (TA) were officially confirmed and formed.

Karen National Union (KNU)

The Karen National Union (KNU), which still upholds the four principles of its chairman Saw Ba U Gyi, was founded on 5 February 1947 and operates through seven districts and twelve departments. The seven districts include Myeik–Tavoy District, which comprises Ler Doh Soh, Ler Mu Lar, Ka Ser Doh, Tanaw Tha Ri and Ler Ka Saw townships and the Htee Moo Pwa Special Area. Within the district, controlled by Brigade 4, are KNLA Battalions 10, 11, 12 and 203 and KNDO Battalion 7. Building the Kawthoolei unit is the KNU's political direction.

Kawthaung District Political Force (KDPO)

In early 2022, after the formation of the Myeik District Political Force was announced, the Kawthaung Township Political Force was first formed with its guidance and with the participation of MPs, CDM teachers and local people. Later that year the Bokpyin Township Political Force was also formed, and in

Kawthaung District Political Force (continued)

October–November the two townships drew up district-level policies and aspirations together and formed the Kawthaung District Political Force. Kawthaung has few indigenous inhabitants and many who settled there for economic reasons, so its people differ in ethnicity, religion and economic background. When the district-level force was formed, political differences were few because of the common goal of establishing a federal unit, but friction later arose from personal rivalries and disagreements within administrative mechanisms.
Differences of view with grassroots forces also arose over NLD MPs' drafting of an interim arrangement. The KDPO has stated firmly only its position that the military dictatorship must fall, and that it will resist by any means any dictatorship that emerges from it.

Myeik District Political Force

At the start of the Spring Revolution in 2021, both armed and political paths emerged. In March/April 2021, local people began trying to organise at the coastal region/Tanintharyi Region level. In 2021 and early 2022, the TNC and student union networks attempted region-level organising, but this stalled for various reasons. In April 2022, township-level political forces began to be built in Palaw, Kyunsu, Tanintharyi and Myeik townships within the district. In May that year the "Myeik District Political Force" was formed with six representatives from each township, and it encouraged and helped other

Myeik District Political Force (continued)

districts to begin organising in the same way. In October and November 2023, the committee of regional hluttaw representatives (CRTA) issued a draft law on drafting an interim arrangement, to which Tanintharyi political forces, including Myeik District, objected. In August 2024, an attempt began to form a region-level political coalition with about 32 local organisations, but it stalled a year later.

4. Perspectives of Groups in Tanintharyi on Current Politics

Besides the ethnic Tavoyan people, Mon and Karen peoples also live in Tavoy, and Mon and Karen armed organisations had been based there since before the coup. These groups differ in historical background, political conviction and regional interests. Among local Tavoyan people there are differing interpretations of Tavoyan national politics, self-administration and self-determination: some want to pursue a separate Tavoyan national political path, while others prefer to proceed as a Tanintharyi federal unit. There have also been differences of opinion and mutual criticism over local resource extraction and military and administrative matters. The TNF, however, has declared that it does not see these differences as conflict, and wants to approach them by

asking how they can be resolved politically and through the principles of "freedom, justice and peaceful coexistence". Between 2022 and 2025, at least four attempts were made to form Tanintharyi Region into a federal unit, but they failed for various reasons. The TNF believes that, beyond the fall of the dictatorship, a dedicated political and military leadership able to shape and lead Tavoy's own destiny is needed to resolve the region's military, political and administrative differences; it was also formed because a leadership was needed that could represent Tavoy in exposing the junta's air strikes, the destruction of resources and the hardships and crises facing the people. The TNF will prioritise resolving through political means, rather than treating as conflict, the differences in historical background, political assumptions and regional interests among the ethnic forces in the region (for example, Tavoyan, Mon and Karen organisations), and aims for political cooperation and a common voice. Upholding the principles of freedom, justice and peaceful coexistence, it will work in territorial control and public service provision only after prior consultation with other organisations, rather than acting unilaterally, and will handle resource extraction and taxation in the region with responsibility and accountability, taking into account the views of local people and the organisations concerned.

For the politics of Tanintharyi Region, the KNU holds that discussions on building a future federal system must give equal voice and rights to organisations regardless of their size. It favours each of the region's

ethnic groups first organising among themselves and then joining inclusive discussions to find solutions gradually, speaking openly, listening, and taking the time to seek answers patiently.

In the spirit of federalism, the KNU holds that diversity must be turned into a strength, and wants mutual recognition of and respect for the literature, culture, customs and ancestral territories of the region's ethnic groups. It believes in building a federal system that strengthens self-determination and self-administration rather than central control, a view that differs from the thinking of the 2020-elected representatives, which is based on the existing administrative map. The KNU also says that future territorial boundaries and the details of the administrative system must be renegotiated step by step on the basis of the ethnic groups' territorial claims. KNU Brigade 4 and the NUG's Tanintharyi Military Region have formed a Brigade Command Team (BCT) that cooperates only on military and revolutionary matters, not political ones, and the NUG has assigned mainly military officials, rather than officials able to make political decisions, to the area.

The Kawthaung District Political Force (KDPO) is rooted in Kawthaung rather than focused on the political development of Tanintharyi Region as a whole, and approaches federalism through a framework that would secure equality for the ethnic and other groups who are minorities among the region's minorities (Moken/Salone, Pashu, Gurkha, Punjabi, Malay, Shan and others). It wants to build upwards from township to

district and from district to federal unit so that grassroots voices are included, and says that honesty and openness are needed as well as good policy. The KDPO believes that the unit-building models of the Bamar-majority Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay regions cannot be copied in the region; politics must instead be negotiated on the basis of the region's diverse character, and the rights of minorities such as the Moken/Salone, for whom direct participation is difficult, must be advanced through representatives who speak on their behalf. Militarily, the KDPO works with the MOD/PDF/PDO; politically, it negotiates directly only with officials of the KNU's Myeik–Tavoy District. Although the KNU has military camps in the area, political matters are decided only by its central leadership, and no political discussions have yet been held in the region.

In Tanintharyi Region, the Tavoy forces (for example, the TNF) base their thinking on national/ethnic self-determination and politics, while the Myeik District Political Force and other forces think in terms of geographic territory. There are divisions between those following the armed path and those preferring a political path, and between the top-down leadership favoured by the party and MPs and a bottom-up model that seeks to include people's voices. The Myeik District Political Force has recommended that revolutionary forces review the whole course of events that led them to choose armed struggle, and has urged them not to assume that holding to a single framework is best. For unit-building,

it recommends making compromises with other forces, respecting differing views and ensuring mutual acceptance and recognition among those in leadership roles; keeping the common enemy in sight and avoiding disunity and conflict among allies; providing protection along with public services once territory is secured; keeping pace politically; and building alliances and seeking solutions with forces such as the TFUCC and KNU Brigade 4. It also holds that the halt in region-level organising by the TPC and the student union network shows that geography-based, district-level organising would be politically stronger and more effective.

According to an interviewee from among the Mon political forces, some want a Tanintharyi federal unit to emerge, while others want to join one of the states. Nevertheless, they propose the development of a bottom-up federal system in Tanintharyi Region, and caution that differences in circumstances must be taken into account in applying in Tanintharyi the federal model pursued in Mon State.

They also recommend that, in shaping Tanintharyi's politics, Mon political forces be taken into account because of their historical role, population and territorial contiguity, even though local Mon political forces are not yet strong owing to their dispersed settlement.

Mon Political Forces

Tanintharyi Region borders Mon State, and Mon communities also live in the region. As neighbours, the peace and development of the two areas are interdependent. Wherever they are, the Mon carry out political activity in a distinctive way, through preserving their history, literature and culture. During the revolution, Mon organisations have been providing military, political and humanitarian (health/relief) services in areas of Tanintharyi such as Ye and Tavoy. Mon revolutionary forces in Tanintharyi include the NMSP, NMSP-AD, MSRF and RDF. The New Mon State Party's district structure included Thaton, Tavoy and Myeik districts. A force that split from the NMSP in 1995 after rejecting the ceasefire agreement remains active as a guerrilla force to this day.

5. Views on the Interim Arrangement

Every interviewee said that diverse Tanintharyi Region, with its many groups and approaches, needs an interim arrangement for federal building that fits the realities on the ground and can be implemented in practice.

Since the 2021 coup, the TNF has tried to establish the region (Tavoy, Myeik and Kawthaung) as a state-level federal unit, but without success in practice. The Tavoy forces therefore regrouped to prioritise work that can actually be implemented. They announced that they would not take

part in the drafting of an interim federal unit arrangement led mainly by the NLD party and MPs, because it is impractical and the current military and political situation is changing. Rather than who leads it, they are watching mainly whether the drafting process works in practice and whether it genuinely represents and reflects local voices.

The KNU assesses that efforts by NLD MPs/the NUG to bring together the interim arrangement and political matters through discussions with Tanintharyi political forces have not produced unity because they were largely not accepted. The KNU holds the principle that it would be wrong to approach future nation-building on the assumption that agreement between two large organisations such as the KNU and the NUG would be accepted by all and settle the matter; others would not accept that, and groups large or small must be given the same rights and voice. It noted that although the NLD/MPs/NUG have made efforts to draft an interim arrangement, local political forces have not disclosed whether they accept it, and as it has not been possible to ask them separately, it cannot yet say precisely.

Because the NLD Central Working Committee and the CRTH unilaterally announced that Tanintharyi forces were taking part in drafting the interim arrangement, without meeting or consulting local political forces, strike committees or civil society groups, the KDPO has rejected that process. It also argues that MPs drafting and enacting the arrangement unilaterally as a single group, on the sole legitimacy of

having been elected and without the drafts and inputs compiled by civil and revolutionary forces, could lead to an authoritarian model. It has therefore demanded that the CRTH suspend its work, and holds that only a system drafted with the participation of all local forces (revolutionary, civil and public) would be consistent with the character of federal democracy.

It regards the NLD-majority drafting process as having proceeded without formally informing or consulting the forces in the region that should and deserve to take part, and as ignoring and disregarding local forces' current political processes and actual circumstances. Its position is that the region's politics must be decided by its people and each of its forces, rather than monopolised by a single group without inclusive participation.

A respondent working on Mon affairs for Mon people in Tanintharyi Region focused mainly on what Mon forces have done rather than on Tanintharyi politics. A Mon revolutionary charter is currently being drafted, and relations and cooperation mechanisms between future state/unit governments are being worked out through the Mon State Consultative Council. The charter contains an agreement on cooperation among revolutionary organisations and future policies on building Mon State. Councils or committees to resolve territorial disputes or armed conflict, should they arise, have also been discussed.

Tanintharyi Federal Unit Constructive Council (TFUCC)

In step with the changing revolutionary and political processes in Myanmar today, winners of the 2020 election, political parties, district political forces and civil society organisations, CDM civil servant groups, unions and youth and women's organisations have worked since the early days of the Spring Revolution to build a federal unit that fully guarantees equality and self-determination, the aspirations of the local people. Through a hybrid in-person and online plenary meeting held on 3–5 February 2026, forces sharing common goals formed the "Tanintharyi Federal Unit Constructive Council" (TFUCC) as a region-level political coalition of 12 organisations.

Letters of congratulation on its formation were sent by the 88 Generation Peace and Open Society, the Women's League of Burma, the Independent CDM Civil Servants Organisation, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the Karenni State Interim Executive Council.

The council has announced that it is preparing a new terms of reference (TOR) so that the "interim arrangement", a key requirement for the emergence of the unit, can be restarted more systematically in line with the will of the people.

The TFUCC has been receiving domestic and international assistance and providing support to local people affected by natural disasters in the region.

Although the TFUCC has declared that it will make serious efforts to bring all revolutionary and political forces in the region on board, it is still negotiating with locally based forces. Because it offered Mon forces in the region (for

Tanintharyi Federal Unit Constructive Council (continued)

example, the Mon State Federal Council – MSFC) only observer status, the MSFC has not yet joined.

6. Characteristics of Groups in the Region

The TNF says that, despite their historical, cultural and artistic traditions, Tavoyan people have historically been regarded as a sub-group of the Bamar and not recognised as Tavoyan. Tavoyan national spirit and conviction were rooted among local people before the coup; afterwards, as people in the region suffered, the question arose: "Who will speak for us (Tavoy)?" Although forces cooperate to fight the dictatorship, a leadership was needed that would take responsibility, as "our own affair", for the hardships people face directly, such as the destruction of local resources and the terrorist junta's air strikes. The TNF was therefore formed to respond systematically through a people- and organisation-based political model, rather than through individuals or fragmented groupings.

Since 2021, the KNU has been working towards a "Kawthoolei Federal Unit" of seven districts/brigades through bottom-up federalism, and the Myeik–Tavoy area of Tanintharyi falls within Brigade 4's territory. It is

therefore taking part in discussions on building a Tanintharyi federal unit. Its political position on the overlap between the Kawthoolei and Tanintharyi federal units is that, rather than a single organisation deciding, it will listen to the voices of the Karen people and the ethnic peoples of Tanintharyi Region and seek a solution through discussion.

Although Kawthaung District is home to a border trade town, local people have shared experiences of discrimination under successive governments: promotion and transfer letters for civil servants arriving later than in other regions; bribes demanded by the immigration department for guest and national registration cards; minorities such as Muslims, Punjabis, Gurkhas and Pashu who have lived there for 40–60 years remaining only associate citizens; and the denial of Form 105 land registration. This has strengthened the conviction that the dictatorship, and any dictatorship that emerges from it, must be overthrown. The Kawthaung District Political Force was formed on the thinking that, rejecting top-down command, it must rise according to the demands of the grassroots. Strengthening the force remains difficult: members have migrated to Thailand to make a living, numbers have fallen owing to health and security difficulties, and frontline fighting forces have limited political resilience. Although they take part in the KDPO, local people's voices are expressed through representatives for reasons of language and culture, and the rights they should enjoy are included in its policies.

Mon people in Tanintharyi Region can organise only on a literary, cultural and social basis rather than as a Mon political group. They support efforts to establish a Tanintharyi federal unit, emphasise bottom-up federalism, and recommend building a strong unit through grassroots groups. They believe that fighting the military dictatorship—the common enemy and common goal—and defending the region are the main tasks of all forces, and that political differences must be resolved through continued negotiation, allowing time and setting out processes.

7. Views on Natural Resource Issues

Tanintharyi Region is rich in natural resources: minerals such as tin, tungsten, gold, iron and coal, offshore natural gas projects, water and biodiversity, valuable tropical rainforests and mangroves. This very abundance is the region's main problem. It must be resolved in connection with politics in the process of building a federal unit, and each group holds different views on it.

Although still at an early stage of organisational development, the TNF has set up mechanisms to monitor resource extraction. It intends that resource extraction be carried out with responsibility and accountability, and that the taxes and revenue it generates be spent in line with the views of local people, with particular focus on humanitarian services such as education, health and food. In areas bordering the territories of

other organisations such as the KNU, it has decided to provide services only after prior consultation with the organisations concerned, rather than on its own organisational position alone.

Although the KNU's current political path has not yet set out taxation and natural resources in detail down to the structure of a central federal government, it already has principles. It rejects the model of previous governments, under which the centre controlled finance and taxation and left nothing for the regions, and proposes that a future central government firmly guarantee the powers and self-determination of federal units and reduce central control.

Kawthaung District has tin mines in Bokpyin, fisheries, and the Yenanchaung–Kawthaung border trade routes. Because its administrative mechanisms are not yet functioning systematically and it does not yet hold territory, the Kawthaung District Political Force does not collect taxes formally; instead, local PDFs/PDOs collect money at waterways and road checkpoints as contributions or through inspections and fines. It sees tax and resource matters as issues that can be addressed politically only once systematic administrative mechanisms and constitutional frameworks have been drafted.

The Myeik District Political Force assesses that the region suffers a "resource curse" because of its abundant resources and the weak rule of law during the revolution. With the armed NUG, EAOs and LPDFs in

the region each having separate policies and tax mechanisms, and with mixed control areas, local people are caught in between and harmed; it plans to address this step by step, through short-term negotiation and long-term political consolidation. In the short term, it will recognise the fragmented control of territory (by the terrorist junta, the NUG, EAOs and mixed areas), gather public voices on resource and tax issues, and seek solutions through negotiation between the NUG and EAOs.

In the long term, it holds that the problem can be solved only by establishing and enacting a common government for a Tanintharyi federal unit/state, a constitution for it, and a tax law for systematic collection.

Mon political forces point out that deep-sea port projects and foreign investment, including from Russia, may expose Tanintharyi Region to greater pressure from the terrorist military than other regions. Although the survey respondent gave no clear position on resources and tax/fiscal matters in Tanintharyi Region, they cautioned that during the revolution some issues may be settled through discussion among forces while disagreements may also arise, which could affect the revolution. They said that the Mon revolutionary charter includes provisions on how groups should cooperate on tax/fiscal and resource matters.

8. Views on a Future Federal System

Groups in the region believe that units should be built and formed on the basis of a federal union, and there are discussions on bottom-up federalism. This section presents their views on why a federal system is needed and how they are pursuing it.

The TNF, whose roughly four attempts to establish a Tanintharyi federal unit failed for various reasons, assesses that although ending military dictatorship and building a federal union are important, the fall of the dictator or the formation of a unit alone will not resolve the region's differences over military, political, administrative and resource-extraction matters. It says it has learned that a strong, people- and organisation-based grouping of its own is needed, one that can shape and lead the destiny of the Tavoyan people and take responsibility for resolving the suffering and problems they face. With people in the region pursuing different future political paths (some wishing to follow a separate path, others to form a federal unit), and with ethnic forces of differing histories and interests, it holds that the practice of prior consultation and the principle of "peaceful coexistence" are needed, rather than seeing diversity as conflict.

The KNU believes that a federal union government cannot emerge without strong federal units based on regions and territories. It also

recommends abandoning the idea that education, religion and border affairs must all be handled by the central government alone.

The Kawthaung District Political Force holds that even with good federal policies, if people are dishonest or self-serving, the seeds of dictatorship can take root, so political honesty and openness are needed. It argues that while Bamar groups in Sagaing, Mandalay and Yangon can organise more easily, Tanintharyi is ethnically diverse and cannot directly copy other units' models. A federal unit can emerge only if the region's distinctive diversity is genuinely accepted and equality and equity are balanced. The organisation can take part directly in building the regional federal unit, but holds that the union level can be reached only through the common agreement of the unit as a whole.

The Myeik District Political Force assesses that although unit-building in Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay offers lessons, the region's ethnic diversity, its coastline and geography, and the large number of armed groups call for a political approach suited to the region. It sees that, because unit-building here has lagged behind other regions and been blocked, local differences have not yet been resolved politically, and patient, inclusive efforts to find solutions must continue.

Because Mon people live dispersed across the country, Mon respondents recommend that a future federal system be based on equality.

They assess that, in building a regional federal unit, Mon people in Tanintharyi should aim to live with dignity on an equal footing with other peoples and to secure ethnic rights; that bottom-up federalism is the most appropriate model; and that only local people should decide. Mon forces encourage and support the emergence of Tanintharyi as a federal unit with self-determination, and say that stronger military and political partnerships should be formed with neighbouring areas, including the Mon, and that community-based organisations should be strengthened.

About Spring Sprouts

Spring Sprouts is a research project of The Ananda Center of Participatory Democracy. It monitors and researches the new landscape and developments of the 2021 Spring Revolution: the political and military organisations taking part in it, their activities, and the alliances among them. Spring Sprouts also provides technical support to revolutionary forces, organises informal meetings and workshops among them, and arranges meetings between revolutionary organisations and international diplomats and organisations.

Spring Sprouts aims to present the ever-changing landscape of the Spring Revolution to the public and the international community through clear and accessible information, visualisations, articles and research. Spring Sprouts holds that public interest, active participation and critical feedback in political processes, and the flow of appropriate and accurate information among those working for democracy, are essential parts of democracy.



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